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Abstract: The term ‘populism’ has gained renewed prominence in Greece during the 
Eurozone crisis, in both public and academic debates. In this article I conceptualize 
populism as a discourse of territorial and temporal particularism, which challenges the 
way a state has been incorporated into the international political and economic system. 
Based on this definition, I question whether oppositional discourses employed by partisan 
actors or official power are wholesale and genuine expressions of populism. Thus, I 
contest the notion that Greece failed due to populism. Instead I draw attention to a failure 
in the official legitimation of modernization by state elites that long preceded the crisis. 
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Introduction 
With the onset in 2010 of the Greek debt crisis and EU-dictated austerity, new parties 
arose in the Greek party system combining opposition to austerity with resentment 
towards the political system – a prototypical populist message. This article argues that the 
intensity of populism in Greece during the crisis is not solely due to the severity of the 
economic downturn (although this is relevant as well). It also is the culmination of a 
long-standing failure of state elites to underpin adaptation to the demands of European 
integration with inclusive visions of the political community. 
Populism is defined here as a response to tensions between territorial political rule 
and external pressures on the state prescribing specific modes of incorporation into the 
global economy. Populism puts forth territorially and temporally circumscribed 
representations of the political community mobilized by disenchantment with how the 
political system mediates between domestic demands and international pressures. In 
semi-peripheral countries in particular the state is the key agent of incorporation into the 
global economy and, therefore, also the locus of contestation between rival 
modernization projects. Greece’s semi-peripherality however is compounded by 
historical legacies like the mismatch between the geographical and normative reach of 
state and nation in the first century of independence. These exacerbated the tension 
between territorial rule and integration in the international system of political and 
economic exchange, and have conditioned the content, character and durability of 
populist politics to this day.  
Populist reactions have thus been a pervasive feature of modern Greek history. It is 
however only in the last 30 years that the antagonistic logic of populism has 
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overshadowed universal visions of the political community in official legitimation of the 
state’s adaptation to dominant international political and economic norms and practices. 
In the context of the Eurozone crisis, this has meant a deepening of the chasm between 
state and society as the former attempts to align with the tenets of European integration 
and, in the process, neutralize the material demands of the latter.  
The article proceeds as follows: First I present a conceptualization of populism that is 
appropriate for the Greek context. I then explain how changes in the international 
environment historically heightened the contradictions between domestic and 
international pressures on the Greek state leading to populist ruptures and official 
counter-responses. Then I analyse populism in Greece during the economic crisis and 
address the conceptual implications of the Greek case based on the themes of this special 
issue. The final section concludes.  
 
Populism, the state and the international: A framework for analysis 
In order to analyse populism in a setting where it is seemingly omnipresent, its 
conceptualization needs to be broad but also crisp enough to allow for a differentiation 
between populist and non-populist phenomena. Ernesto Laclau’s understanding of 
populism is well suited both for the study of populism beyond the partisan arena and as a 
phenomenon in need of historical contextualization1.  
Laclau conceptualizes populism as a dichotomous discourse that bundles together 
frustrated social demands by constructing a political subject (usually, but not necessarily, 
embodied in the signifier of ‘the people’2) crystalizing opposition to ‘power’. This ‘logic 
of equivalence’ contrasts with the ‘logic of difference’, where demands are separated 
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before they become accommodated, and social groups are incorporated in administrative 
practices (Laclau, 2005a; 2005b). Populism arises whenever parts of a political 
community feel excluded from the ‘presumed coincidence between the community and a 
discursive formation characteristic of institutional discourse’ (Arditi, 2010: 493).  
A key part of equivalential demands is the aspiration of excluded members of the 
community to define themselves as the legitimate whole community (Laclau, 2005a: 81) 
– for example in challenging formal definitions of the nation through discourses of the 
‘real people’ (Arditi, 2010: 490; also Stavrakakis, 2014). Thus a major impetus for the 
emergence of populism is membership tensions between the officially and institutionally 
defined limits and criteria of belonging to a political community and what some consider 
as the just membership of this community. 
But purely populist political projects are ideal-types (Laclau, 2005b: 46-47). Official 
power will always accommodate elements of particularistic discourses in how it 
incorporates demands. Dichotomous discourses may also be maintained when populists 
acquire political power but cannot (or will not) institutionalize their vision of the people 
as a new hegemonic discourse that defines the whole political community. In these cases 
the new power-holders may employ what Laclau calls langues de bois, discourses of 
legitimation that aim to shelter the new official power from newly emerging social 
demands by maintaining the sense of antagonistic division of society that informed 
populism’s rise in the first place.  
The ‘power’ or ‘political system’ is embedded in a system of interactions with other 
states structured by formal rules and informal norms about acceptable modes of domestic 
political and economic governance (Bull, 1977). The state generally mediates the 
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incorporation of economy and society in the international political and economic system. 
The state also aims at its own preservation, not only in the sense of protection from 
outside threats (Morgenthau, 1948) or engagement with the global economy (Gilpin, 
1987), but also of synchronization with global norms of political and economic 
governance that allow it to reproduce as legitimate political authority on the international 
stage (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 22-23).  
Thus the mismatch between state and society, which Laclau sees as almost inevitable 
in any political system, is complicated by pressures for international adaptation that all 
states are exposed to. Populism is not the expression of particularity only in the sense of 
weaving together unmet partial demands, but it also represents visions of circumscribed 
territoriality and temporality. These visions contrast with norms and practices of world 
politics that are often expressed in normative and universal terms - ‘rationalization’,    
‘reform’, an ever expanding palette of ‘rights’ in need of protection etc. – and that 
impinge on states and economies of all stages of development. 
In the global periphery and the semi-periphery the state is a powerful actor in relation 
to relatively underdeveloped institutions like the market and society, but it is also a 
porous and contested field. Populism in these settings does not express just frustrated 
popular demands (these are present in mature economies as well), but also rival 
programmes of incorporation to international modernity. Modernization thus is not 
benevolent or linear, but a process of synchronization to dominant global norms and 
prescriptions about organization of the state, market and society. By the same token, 
populism is not an aberration or an anomaly (Stavrakakis, 2014: 514), but a reaction to 
processes that claim normativity and universality.  
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On the other hand, the effort by political power to treat social demands is never a 
domestic strategy alone. Domestic discourses of difference and the external adaptation of 
the state are mutually dependent. Elites often go abroad to deflect domestic pressures by 
pointing to external threats, institutional constraints or the diachronic interests of the 
nation on the world stage – tactics that have been particularly prominent in Europe under 
the pressures of EU-led integration (see for example Dyson and Featherstone, 1996).   
In sum, even though populism envisages that the chain of demands it coalesces 
(constituted as the ‘real people’) will eventually define the whole political community, it 
initially emerges as an expression of territorial and temporal particularism (demands to be 
satisfied ‘here and now’) and partiality. The particularism of populism becomes even 
more apparent if it is seen as a reaction not only of society against the ‘system’, but also 
of society against specific patterns of incorporation of the domestic into the international. 
State elites on the other hand usually employ the vision of an internally differentiated but 
inclusive political community. This idea of diversity-in-unity (Abts and Rummens, 2007) 
translates domestically, and is underpinned by, the universality of the international 
mainstream to which the state is trying to adapt.  
 
Historical legacies of populism in Greece 
Sometimes understood as ‘Westernization’ and more recently as ‘Europeanization’, 
modernization has been both a widespread aspiration and a highly contested goal in 
Greece (Featherstone, 2005). Greece’s geographical and cultural liminality has made 
modernization both synonymous to progress and subject to different definitions by forces 
that seek to resist it or (more often) co-opt it. It is at the intersection of these rival 
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agendas of modernization that populism arises. Based on Laclau’s concepts of 
equivalence and difference, we can distinguish three gradations of territorially and 
temporally demarcated representations of political identity in Greece:  
a) Wholesale populist ruptures, the most genuine appearance of populism. They 
are expressed in extra-institutional popular mobilizations that challenge the 
state’s claim to universal representation of the political community and express 
the ambition of neglected or dislocated parts to redefine the character and 
limits of the whole political community.  
b) Movements or parties partaking in institutionalized processes (e.g. elections). 
They will express equivalential chains of demands that seek to modify the 
terms of popular incorporation in international economy and modernity. But 
the fact that they use institutional channels makes it difficult to determine 
where they stop expressing genuine challenges to the system and where they 
begin to act as agents of popular incorporation (however dialectic and 
conflictual) to the state’s agenda of modernization.  
c) Finally, antagonistic discourses can be promoted by elites to compensate for 
the dislocations of modernization and international adaptation. These langues 
de bois often are residues of populist discourses that were integrated in the 
official language of legitimation after their bearers acquired political power.  
As we will see, the limits between the latter two categories are diffuse and context-
dependent, thus making the first category of outright rupture the only clear-cut expression 
of populism as defined here.  
 
 8 
Ruptures 
After the Greek state achieved independence in 1830, it aimed to create a centralized 
administration within its territorial limits. The first populist rupture came when a popular 
uprising in 1843 demanded a constitution from Greece’s Bavarian-born king. In the 
constitutional assembly of 1843-44 the main dividing line became the one between the 
autochthones and the heterochthones – those who believed that only Greeks from the 
Greek state should have full citizenship rights and access to political office and those who 
thought that also Greeks from the Ottoman Empire should be able to do so. The 
autochthones reflected popular frustrations against an alien centralizing state and the 
majority of political elites, who were heterochthones. As such, the mismatch between 
state and nation turned general dissent into a political identity moulding for the first time 
the opposition between the people and the political system, and the territorial and the 
universal (Petropulos, 1985 [1968]: 611-616).  
In response to the autochthone insurgency, elites made two decisive turns: They 
adopted irredentism – the liberation and incorporation into Greece of Greeks still living 
in the Ottoman Empire – as the official mission of the state (Kitromilides, 1989: 165), 
and electoral democracy as the means for incorporation of popular demands in the 
political system. This allowed post-Ottoman elites to reinvent themselves as electoral 
notables who could use state resources as rewards for their clients (Tsoukalas, 1980: 287-
292).  
From then until 1922 the Greek state was an irredentist state. As European capitalism 
encroached on the Eastern Mediterranean in the 1860s, a thriving Greek bourgeoisie 
engaged in commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire introduced large-scale capitalist 
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investments in Greece. Coupled with the ideological dominance of irredentism, the Greek 
state perceived and projected internally the universality of the capitalist economy as the 
universality of the Greek unredeemed nation. Ideologically as much as economically, the 
Greek state became the object of colonial dependence on its own national (but de-
territorialized) bourgeoisie (Tsoukalas, 1977: 266). 
Frustrations with economic and foreign policy failures exploded into a military coup 
and a popular uprising in 1909. Given that its most significant legacy was the rise to 
power of arch-modernizer Eleftherios Venizelos, the dominant interpretation of 1909 has 
been as a bourgeois revolution that led the Greek state under the control of the Greek 
capitalist class of the Ottoman Empire (Mavrogordatos, 1983: 121-127). While this was 
indeed the culmination of 1909, other interpretations see that mass mobilization, even if it 
was eventually channelled towards a bourgeois-modernizing direction, as an expression 
of egalitarian-democratic frustration with the state’s capture by big moneyed interests 
(Potamianos, 2004).  
Eleftherios Venizelos represented the most coherent combination of the universality 
of modernity and of Greek irredentism (Andreopoulos, 1989). Venizelism’s potency 
however also engendered a virulent reaction. Anti-Venizelism was a prototypical populist 
reaction to the state’s espousal of universal norms of modernity. It eventually coalesced a 
long chain of frustrations united by a territorially and temporally particularistic view of 
their interests: the localism of southern Greece, alienated by the increase of the territory 
of the Greek state between 1912 and 1920; the urban petit bourgeois, who saw their 
importance rapidly diminish after 1909; and the linguistic and religious minorities that 
became incorporated in the Greek state after the northward territorial expansion of the 
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Balkan Wars in 1912-13 (Mavrogordatos, 1983). In light of the congruence between 
modernization and irredentism in Venizelos’ message, the anti-Venizelists simply denied 
the universalism of the Greek nation by prioritizing their own definition of a virtuous 
people within the old borders of Greece (Mavrogordatos, 2015: 216-230)3.  
There is then an analogy between 1843-44 and the aftermath of 1909. In both cases 
mass popular mobilization expressed dissatisfaction among all social groups with the 
state’s tentative and uneven efforts (and failures) to modernize (Andreopoulos, 1989: 
199). These generalized populist ruptures contained multiple visions of change 
(Potamianos, 2004). But as the demands for change were co-opted by agendas of 
modernization, more coherent populist identities crystallized (Mavrogordatos, 2015: 267; 
Potamianos, 2015: 261). The autochthones and the anti-Venizelists radicalized 
membership tensions of the political community around anti-universal territorialized 
identities and frustration with the state’s modernizing pretences. The massive and violent 
demonstrations of November 1916 (Mavrogordatos, 2015: 271-286) were the apex of the 
populist rupture based on the residual anti-Venizelist identity.  
Greece’s irredentist project led it after World War I to occupy large swaths of the 
Ottoman Empire. Turkish nationalists reacted and after a two-year war Greek forces 
evacuated the Turkish shores in 1922 followed by the mass of the Greek population 
living there. After the Asia Minor disaster the external mismatch between state and nation 
became an internal one, as the arrival of one million refugees posed new problems of 
inclusion and definition of the political community. For the first time state and nation 
coincided geographically. However the legacy of contestation between particularistic and 
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universal views of the political community continued to inform political competition 
(Mavrogordatos, 1983). 
World War II and the German occupation catalysed another popular rejection of the 
state and its elites, deprived of the legitimating ideology of irredentism. The immense 
popularity of the communist-led EAM opposition front led after the occupation to a bitter 
Civil War between Communists and Loyalists (1944-49). The post-civil war state 
attempted to neutralize social demands under the guise of capitalist modernization and of 
electoralism combined with a massive system of suppression of the left. The economic 
growth of the 1950s and 1960s created a vast new urban petit bourgeois and working 
class with material demands (Mouzelis, 1979) interlocking with political identities 
created during the Civil War. A nascent populist rupture emerged in the 1960s, when the 
Venizelist camp was gradually taken over by demands of the new urban strata for 
democracy, social justice and national emancipation. The military coup of 1967 pre-
empted the further expression of this new populist identity. 
 
Parties and movements 
In the second half of the 19th century the state based its legitimacy on irredentism 
while becoming a field for the financial activities of a national but de-territorialized 
bourgeoisie. The populist reaction to these patterns of incorporation to global capitalism 
was the party of Theodoros Diligiannis (who was intermittently prime-minister for half of 
the time between 1885 and 1905). Diligiannis coalesced a variety of frustrations: anti-
plutocratic feelings against diaspora capitalists who came to Greece to speculate and 
exert influence over the political class; social conservatism; resentment at taxes levied for 
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the financing of infrastructure projects; and an impulsive desire for swift satisfaction of 
Greek irredentist demands (Potamianos, 2015: 502-503).  
Another example of populist discourse in the electoral arena was the anti-Venizelist 
camp in the interwar period. After 1922 the anti-Venizelists, who were in government 
when Turkey defeated Greece and were thus held responsible for the defeat, found 
themselves in the position of permanent opposition. They continued to put forward the 
vision of the virtuous, downtrodden, territorially and temporally demarcated ‘people’ 
(peasants of southern Greece, petit bourgeois strata, and religious and linguistic 
minorities) threatened by modernization and the universal, civic Venizelist ‘nation’ 
(Papadimitriou, 2006).  
 
Universal and antagonistic legitimations of the state 
With irredentism the Greek state discovered a powerful justification for 
modernization in the 19th century. Irredentism bridged or fragmented social demands and 
allowed the state to put through a far-reaching nation-building programme 
(Andreopoulos, 1989: 198; Kitromilides, 1989: 159-168). Irredentism was sharpened 
with Venizelism, where the universalism of bourgeois modernity became entangled with 
the universalism of an economically vibrant Hellenism. The Greek state was to embrace 
both by way of its simultaneous modernization and expansion.  
After 1922 the Venizelist state embraced a differential treatment of demands. The 
irredentist agenda of  bourgeois transformation was transported internally as rationalized 
accommodation of diverse social demands. In the same vain, the official ideology of the 
post-civil war state drew on idealized notions developed by liberal intellectuals since the 
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1930s of the universality of Hellenism and its preordained alignment with Western 
modernity (Papadimitriou, 2006: 163-166).  
After the military dictatorship, the right-wing leader Constantine Karamanlis aimed to 
establish a functioning liberal democratic regime. Karamanlis tried to deflect challenges 
to the social regime and Greece’s position in the West by increasing public economic 
interventionism and by shifting the point of reference of Greece’s Western orientation 
from the US to Europe. As a response to the populist semi-rupture of the mid-1960s, the 
post-1974 republic tried to improve the terms of popular incorporation in the political 
system as well as make integration with the West more palatable.  
Yet successive regimes have also employed antagonistic discourses to legitimize state 
rationalization and modernization. For example in his early days in power Eleftherios 
Venizelos adopted some of the anti-vested interests rhetoric that had characterized the 
1909-10 popular mobilizations (Potamianos, 2004: 127). Perhaps the most typical 
example of exclusion-as-elite-discourse was the anti-communism of the post-Civil War 
state. Drawing on anti-Venizelism’s legacy of a morally exclusive view of the ‘people’ 
(Papadimitriou, 2006: 174-175), the popular anti-communism of the post-war Right did 
not just reflect internal security and foreign policy considerations, but also neutralized 
part of social disgruntlement at a time of economic transformation.  
 
The long eclipse of universalism: The Euro-clientelist state 
The electoral victory of the socialist PASOK of Andreas Papandreou in 1981 – an 
example of populist rupture effected through the ballot box – coincided with Greece 
joining the EEC (later EU). Electoralism and patronage had long been standard modes of 
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social incorporation, but PASOK updated them via a system of partisan clientelism 
(Mavrogordatos, 1997). Given the parallel process of European market integration that 
Greece partook in, external constraints and domestic demands entered into a complicated 
relationship. This Euro-clientelist state faced a new set of opportunities and challenges 
with respect to incorporating social demands.  
PASOK’s re-election in 1985, in a hotly contested election against the conservative 
New Democracy, was followed by Papandreou’s decision to commit Greece to the EEC’s 
revamped project of continental market liberalization, upending PASOK’s early 
Euroscepticism. Papandreou’s divisive rhetoric remained a fixture of political life until 
his death in 1996, but after the 1980s PASOK ceased being a populist reaction to the 
mismatch between domestic material demands and the state’s international commitments. 
Instead PASOK became the hub for the negotiation of the tension between popular 
demands and pressures by the EEC/EU for rationalization of the state’s functioning. 
Despite these pressures, the state consistently fostered the gradual middle-classization of 
large parts of PASOK’s original petit bourgeois and working class following.  
PASOK’s mutation into manager of the divide between domestic and international 
pressures was completed with the takeover of the party by a leadership of social-
democratic ilk in 1996. This leadership tried to balance their wish to bring Greece into 
the European common currency, which demanded severe budgetary retrenchment, with 
PASOK’s identification with popular material demands. Given that New Democracy was 
already pro-European and economically liberal, after the mid-1990s the two parties’ 
policy outlook became almost indistinguishable. Persistent phenomena like the two 
parties’ rhetoric of outbidding are sometimes seen as expressions of populism during this 
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period (Pappas, 2013). But I would argue that in the Euro-clientelist state of the 1990s 
and 2000s partisan outbidding and promises for access to state resources constituted a 
convergent strategy of neutralization of social demands, i.e. the langue de bois of the 
state, not populism as defined here. After 1990 genuine populist reactions to the state’s 
alignment with Europe were mostly expressed outside the electoral arena (e.g. in the 
discourse of the Orthodox Church, see Stavrakakis, 2004). 
PASOK’s embedding of modernization in a rearticulated dichotomous discourse 
(against the alleged backwardness and conservatism of major parts of Greek society) 
meant that modernization was perceived less as a way to satisfy the long-term goals of an 
inclusively defined political community and more as a new source of division. To be 
sure, the modernizers of PASOK flirted with a universal-nationalist discourse, for 
example in the elevation of the 2004 Olympic Games to the status of a major national 
goal. Ultimately however, integration to the European mainstream was increasingly 
justified with reference to particularistic identities – partisan allegiance and sectoral 
demands that required immediate validation in return of support for modernizing policies. 
Thus modernization became embedded in PASOK’s traditional polarization strategy, 
which reflected the party’s rooting in an exclusive, morally defined identity built on 
antagonism with the historical legacy of the post-Civil War Right. As Eleftheriou and 
Tassis (2013: 134-148) show, ‘anti-right polarization’, a lynchpin of PASOK’s capacity 
to antagonistically divide the political field, remained a key element of its strategy under 
its modernizing leadership. New Democracy followed a more moderate language of 
outbidding but converted completely to the practices of PASOK with regards to popular 
incorporation. When it returned to power in 2004 it practiced partisan clientelism even 
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more recklessly than its rival, paving the way for the derailment of public finances in 
2009.  
 
Populism and the Eurozone crisis 
Eurozone austerity broke the compromise between mass integration and state 
reproduction via European resources and legitimation. It is telling that the political 
system of the Euro-clientelist state initially tried to contain the contestation of Greece’s 
relationship with Europe within the confines of two-party outbidding. When in 2009 New 
Democracy instituted the first austerity measures, PASOK opposed them and campaigned 
in the snap elections that followed on a platform of increased spending. PASOK won but 
when it agreed on a bailout with the EU and IMF in 2010, New Democracy opposed the 
deal.  
New Democracy’s opposition to austerity in 2010-11 contributed to the emergence of 
the political identity of the anti-memorandum (referring to the official name of the bailout 
agreement). But this identity was only crystallized during the mass demonstrations in 
front of the Greek parliament in the summer of 2011, inspired by the Spanish Indignados. 
These demonstrations can be seen as yet another genuine populist rupture against the 
Greek state. Opposition to austerity was one reason for mobilization, but the anti-
memorandum rallied also concerns about national sovereignty and frustrations with 
elites. Anti-system feelings persisted until, under the threat of expulsion from the euro, 
New Democracy agreed to form a government with PASOK in late 2011 to implement a 
second bailout (Katsambekis, 2016: 392-393).  
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As the two traditional opponents of Greek politics formed a coalition, the capacity of 
their competition to absorb popular frustrations and material demands collapsed. As a 
result popular frustration migrated from the streets to the party system (Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis, 2014: 126). On the right New Democracy suffered a split with the 
emergence of the nationalist Independent Greeks (ANEL) party and the rise of the neo-
Nazi Golden Dawn. On the left PASOK came under the pressure of the radical left 
SYRIZA, whose leader Alexis Tsipras started blending his critique of neoliberalism with 
a virulent anti-establishment discourse. 
The two elections of May and June 2012 gave rise to a transformed and fragmented 
party system, with PASOK’s support collapsing and SYRIZA arising as the main 
opposition party. The formation in June 2012 of a cross-ideological pro-European 
coalition (New Democracy, PASOK and the smaller Democratic Left party) formalized 
the memorandum as the main dividing line of Greek politics. This changed how the party 
system dealt with international pressures and domestic demands – from a distribution of 
labour between two parties that espoused rationalization of the state and incorporated 
popular demands through outbidding and clientelism, to a divide between a pro-European 
camp prioritizing Greece’s long-term European orientation and an anti-austerity camp 
prioritizing immediate material demands (Katsanidou and Otjes, 2016; Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis, 2014).  
 During the years of the pro-European coalition under New Democracy leader 
Antonis Samaras from 2012 to 2015, New Democracy and PASOK tried to justify 
austerity as a way for Greece to remain aligned with the European mainstream. PASOK 
leader Evangelos Venizelos4 captured the particularist/universalist divide perfectly when 
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he said that PASOK ‘sacrificed the people to protect the nation’5 – an obvious reference 
to the divide between the temporally and territorially circumscribed and universal. That 
this statement came from the leader of the party that first came to power in 1981 with the 
slogan ‘Here and Now’ was particularly ironic.  
Yet the Samaras government increasingly relied on a renewed langue de bois that 
drew on previous practices of antagonistic justification of modernization of the state. 
Right-wing politicians of New Democracy resurrected anti-communism as a way to 
mobilize conservative fears of SYRIZA. Popular frustrations with austerity were 
dismissed as demands of vested interests, unions and privileged groups, thus reproducing 
the dismissal of social demands as ‘backwards’ and ‘conservative’ by PASOK’s social-
democratic leadership in the 1990s.  
After the elections of January 2015 an anti-austerity coalition of two populist parties, 
SYRIZA and ANEL, was formed that crossed conventional ideological lines. Their 
victory reflected the exhaustion of the Euro-clientelist state and its inability to translate 
European integration into a domestic vision of the whole political community. The extent 
of this became evident in the referendum of July 2015 organized by the SYRIZA-ANEL 
government as part of its effort to renegotiate the terms of financing from the EU. Even 
though the referendum concerned formally an austerity package offered by the creditors, 
Tsipras explicitly framed it as a choice between the anti-memorandum government and 
the ‘restoration’ of the old parties. 
Despite warnings of economic disaster, more than 60% of Greeks voted with the 
government. The No vote straddled ideological camps and social classes. It was united by 
a firm resentment against the elites of the Euro-clientelist state and their betrayal of 
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material demands in order to satisfy European imperatives of rationalization of the state. 
The Yes campaign tried to make references to Greece’s belonging to a Europe of 
universal values, but it failed to disentangle Europe from the elites of the Greek state or 
to relate it to a universal vision of the political community.  
As in previous cases (from the revolution of 1843 to the autochthones in 1844; from 
the general popular call for renewal of 1909 to the fanatic anti-Venizelist demonstrations 
of 1916; from PASOK’s inclusive call for ‘Change’ in 1981 to its re-election campaign 
mobilizing Civil War-era themes and divisions in 1985), there was an evolution of the 
identity of the populist rupture from the loose to the specific and from the general to the 
partial. The demonstrations of 2011 reflected a broad protest against the political system 
as a whole, catalysed by austerity. The referendum of 2015 represented the evolution of 
this general feeling of discontent into a more coherent populist identity that explicitly 
rejected the identification of the political community with the universal themes of 
European integration. The referendum campaign showcased a deep divide between two 
conceptions of the community: one territorial and particularistic, seeking immediate 
material restitution; the other temporally and territorially universalist, emphasising 
Greece’s long-term alignment with Europe.  
The populist rupture of the referendum did not translate politically however. At the 
last moment Tsipras changed tack and agreed a new bailout agreement with Greece’s 
creditors. Within weeks SYRIZA changed from a party expressing a popular 
equivalential chain of demands to a party employing a langue de bois against its 
competitors in order to domesticate popular dissent. The snap elections of September 
2015 that returned the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition were won on the basis of an 
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equivalential rearticulation (Laclau 2005a) – from the memorandum/anti-memorandum 
divide to the opposition between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’.  
With the main bearer of a populist challenge now absorbed in the logic of the Euro-
clientelist state, the latter’s capacity to balance domestic and international demands 
seemed to be renewed. Not unlike previous examples of antagonistic discourses in the 
electoral arena (most prominently, PASOK in the 1990s), SYRIZA’s rhetoric turned from 
a genuine expression of popular dissatisfaction to an instrument of domestication of 
social demands without fundamentally changing the terms of the state’s adaptation to 
dominant international norms and prescriptions of political and economic governance.  
 
Theoretical implications of the Greek case  
The shifting social bases of populism 
The Greek case has interesting implications for the question of the social bases of 
populism. First, disaffected groups need not be subaltern but could actually have 
benefited from modernization strategies in the past. Second, which groups coalesce 
around antagonistic and particularistic discourses of exclusion will evolve through time. 
Third, populism mostly reflects varied and cross-class coalitions. The example of the 
Athenian petit bourgeoisie of the early-20th century is indicative of the ambiguities of the 
social character of populism.  
The urban petit bourgeoisie emerged as Greece became embedded in the European 
capitalist networks impinging on the Ottoman world. To the extent that the state invited 
the financialization of the economy after the 1860s, the petit bourgeoisie owed to it its 
existence and reproduction. For this reason, while it became identified primarily with 
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Diligiannis, many of its members were attracted to his rival, Charilaos Trikoupis, and his 
program of state rationalization (Potamianos, 2015: 503).     
The merchants and artisans of Athens were at the forefront of popular mobilization 
after the coup of 1909. With Venizelos in power however, the state became more clearly 
the agent of the de-territorialized Greek bourgeoisie. The petit bourgeoisie despised 
Venizelist labour legislation that threatened to fragment their guilds and foster in their 
employees a working class mentality (Mavrogordatos, 2015: 256-257; Potamianos, 2015: 
398-399). In the violent anti-Venizelist mobilization of 1916 the Athenian petit 
bourgeoisie played again a significant role, this time as the exponent of a decidedly 
parochial identity. In Mavrogordatos’ words (2015: 247), if 1909 had been a bourgeois 
revolution, 1915-16 was a ‘petit bourgeois counter-revolution’.  
On a different level however, the schism between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists 
also split the petit bourgeoisie, with merchants attracted to Venizelos’ promise of 
increased commercial opportunities and artisans antagonized by the prospect of 
industrialization and social differentiation along class lines (ibid: 249-251). What divided 
the two groups was not class appeals but different logics of articulating and addressing 
social interests. Contrary to the Venizelist conception of class interests that were to be 
tackled differentially (Andreopoulos, 1989), the anti-Venizelists put forth the vision of 
strata organically linked in the traditional artisan shop, where owners and employees – 
the undifferentiated ‘people’ – worked side-by-side. This appealed particularly to sub-
sections of the petit bourgeoisie who fretted modernization (Mavrogordatos, 2015: 266-
267; Potamianos, 2015: 399).  
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An analogous pattern can be detected in the Eurozone crisis. Thanks to state spending 
and the opening up of Greece to European financial markets in the years of EU and EMU 
membership, the Euro-clientelist state had assisted the emergence of a new middle class. 
This middle class formed the bulk of the mobilization in the summer of 2011 in protest 
against austerity and the reversal of the compromise between material advancement of 
society and adaptation to European rules by the state.  
The subsequent translation of the populist rupture into party politics acquired a clear 
socioeconomic character. The double elections of 2012 revealed a strong socioeconomic 
dimension of the memorandum cleavage (Mavris, 2013). Anti-memorandum parties 
(SYRIZA, ANEL, Golden Dawn) did substantially better in working class and petit 
bourgeois districts, while their ideological equivalents (Democratic Left, PASOK, New 
Democracy) did better in better-off areas. The middle class remained equivocal towards 
the state, primarily due to fears of rapid economic collapse if Greece left the euro.  
Progressively the socioeconomic dimension of the memorandum cleavage decreased 
as austerity hit the middle class. SYRIZA aimed to address a broad variety of frustrations, 
from public sector pensioners and employees to small businessmen, homeowners, the 
youth and the unemployed (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014: 128-131). In 2015, after 
years of punishing austerity, a vast part of the middle class created and then targeted for 
extraction by the Euro-clientelist state finally turned to SYRIZA, contributing to its major 
victories in the January elections and the July referendum. In the referendum all but the 
most affluent suburbs of Athens voted with Tsipras and his government6. 
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International and historical dimensions 
One focus of this special issue is the role of the international as a conditioning factor 
of the specific character of populist challenges. If the state is the main addressee of 
popular demands as well as an actor with the independent capacity to regulate economic 
and political life while pursuing its own reproduction (Mann, 1984), the international 
dimension is crucial as the environment within which this actor is embedded. In Greece, 
the encroachment of capitalism in the Ottoman space after the 1860s, the Cold War, 
neoliberal globalization, and European integration posed specific demands on the state 
and hence generated specific types of populist reaction. 
Another aspect is the role of historical legacies in the specific expression of populism. 
Without making a blanket historical argument, it is interesting to note here continuities 
between political legacies, for example the petit bourgeois support in Diligiannis’ 
coalition, the popular demonstrations of 1909, and the anti-Venizelist reaction in the 
1910s. Anti-Venizelism’s interwar particularism and morally exclusive view of the 
legitimate political community became a valuable resource as a langue de bois for post-
war anti-communism. The Civil War and quasi-rupture of the 1960s informed 
Papandreou’s populism in the 1980s, and the actors of the anti-memorandum identity 
during the Eurozone crisis have made frequent references to the occupation and national 
resistance of the 1940s. Thus different traditions of populist discourses and mobilizations 
inform and become absorbed in each other through time. 
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Populism and nationalism 
As discussed in the introduction, populism aims to integrate groups that are (or feel) 
marginalized, but to the extent that it also elevates specific conceptions of the ‘people’ to 
the level of the legitimate whole political community (Stavrakakis, 2014: 506) populism 
can be internally exclusive (since it excludes from the definition of the whole community 
characteristics that are not present in its definition of the ‘people’). Nationalism on the 
other hand is exclusive in that it seeks to demarcate a community and endow it with a 
political expression. But once this has been achieved, nationalism can also be inclusive, 
particularly if civic definitions of the community predominate or if ethnic, religious and 
other divisions are weak or absent. Thus nationalism is externally exclusive, but can often 
be internally inclusive.  
In Greece there has been a constant historical dialectic between nationalism as 
politics of difference and populism as politics of equivalence. For example, Venizelist 
irredentism was externally exclusive since it had territorial aspirations against other states 
and ethnicities. Anti-Venizelism energized a division inside the political community of 
Greeks, prioritizing a specific idea of the people to the point of outright hostility towards 
the unredeemed Greeks of the Ottoman Empire represented by Venizelos.  
The exhaustion of inclusive discourses during the Euro-clientelist state can be seen as 
a byproduct of the discursive weakness of the universal and diachronic nation. The 
‘nation’ was anyway debilitated as a discursive tool after 1974 due to its association with 
the post-Civil War state and the junta. Papandreou’s 1980s rhetoric was an example of 
populism’s inclusionary potential, since it reintegrated popular masses to the political 
system. But his success, and PASOK’s need to maintain political dominance after his 
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death, meant that from then on adaptation to European integration would be largely 
legitimated through reference to exclusive political identities rather than to an inclusive 
political community (which is how the reconstituted Right tried to justify Greece’s EEC 
entry after the fall of the dictatorship in the second half of the 1970s).  
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the New Democracy prime minister in the early-1990s, was 
perhaps the last Greek statesman apt to making more references to the ‘nation’ and its 
timeless interests than to the ‘people’ and its ephemeral demands in order to justify 
alignment with the West after the Cold War. Interestingly enough, even Andreas 
Papandreou after he returned to power in 1993 felt the need to make reference to the 
universal and diachronic nation to justify a turn towards fiscal rationalization: ‘Either the 
nation will eliminate the debt, or the debt will exterminate the nation’ 7 . Ultimately 
however PASOK’s modernizing turn in the 1990s ended up being based on an updated 
version of the party’s antagonistic discourse, whereby anchoring to Europe was justified 
through partisanship and delegitimation of opponents. Antonis Samaras also relied on a 
polarizing discourse delegitimizing the SYRIZA opposition to justify austerity in 2012-
15.  
Thus in the Euro-clientelist state the particularism of populism dominated official 
justification of alignment with Europe in the shape of partisan langues de bois. Not 
populism per se but its dichotomous logic that persisted in official legitimation crowded 
out references to a diverse but unified political community that, while inhabiting a 
specific territory demarcated by national boundaries, would engage with the globalized 
economy and align with universal international norms. While in Greece, as in many other 
European countries, there had been an attempt to justify Europeanization  based on long-
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term national strategic interests, aggregate economic benefits or administrative 
efficiency, ‘Europe’ eventually became absorbed in discourses and practices that 
deepened the chasm between the state and people. This in turn crucially conditioned the 
elites’ capacity to convince society of the necessity of ‘reforms’ after 2010. 
 
Genuine challenge to the system or domestication of popular demands? 
In cases of populism within the formal confines of political competition (e.g. 
Diligiannis in the late-20th century, the anti-Venizelists of the 1920s, PASOK in the 
1980s, SYRIZA today) it is interesting to note the duality of stability and destabilization. 
For as much as these populist movements expressed reactions to the way state elites 
balanced domestic and international pressures, they also ensured that these reactions were 
channelled through institutionalized processes thus updating, when they entered 
government, the ways the state addressed popular demands.  
In many ways the boundary between genuine long-standing populist reaction in the 
electoral arena and institutional langues de bois is unclear and shifts over time. 
Antagonistic reaction to and populist-like legitimation of the state are parts of a 
continuum, along which the same actor or party may move over time. This confluence is 
probably inevitable for any populist party that manages to gain power. A degree of 
particularism can complement universal discourses and help the state bridge conflicting 
domestic and international pressures. But this cannot be a perfect substitute for universal 
legitimating ideologies altogether. If these are weak or absent, as they increasingly were 
in the Euro-clientelist state of the 1990s and 2000s, the prevalence of legitimations 
drawing on partial political identities inevitably leads to exhaustion of legitimacy itself.  
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Conclusion 
This article analysed populism in Greece by drawing on a conceptualization of 
populism as a binary logic of politics that seeks to redefine the limits and character of the 
political community. While populism aims at this redefinition of the whole political 
community, at its starting point lies the partiality of specific unmet social demands. To 
the extent that the political system which populism addresses is embedded in an 
international structure of economic exchange and norms of governance, populism is 
particularistic also in the sense of opposing the patterns of a state’s incorporation into the 
international system.  
The struggle between territorial and temporal particularism and the exigencies of 
international political and economic modernity naturally lends itself to the articulation of 
oppositions between the ‘people’ and ‘power’, particularly in peripheral societies where 
the state’s role in mediating the domestic and the international is both exceedingly 
important and heavily contested. In Greece this is compounded by the historical 
contestation of the character of a national community itself split between contrasting 
visions of territoriality and universality for over a century. This duality of the Greek 
political community’s universal, open, entrepreneurial and diasporic past on the one 
hand, and its rooted, territorial and parochial character that has informed a succession of 
populist reactions since the mid-19th century on the other, still informs Greek 
ambivalence towards Europe and Western modernity in general.  
This article differentiated between genuine populist ruptures and discourses of official 
legitimation that rely on populism’s logic of circumscribed political identities. While this 
logic has historically been pervasive in Greek politics, it has co-existed and cross-
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fertilized inclusive, universalist and technocratic discourses both in partisan politics and 
in the state’s legitimation. Thus, even if populist-like politics has seemingly been 
omnipresent in Greece, genuine populist ruptures as defined here have been actually rare.  
One can even say that populism never really became hegemonic in the sense of 
imposing a new definition and new terms of inclusion in the political community. While 
inevitably making use of exclusive discourses to a certain degree, in the past Greek elites 
managed to rebound from populist ruptures by effectively translating pressures for 
rationalization and modernization of the state into potent universal visions of the political 
community. Irredentism cultivated in the 19th century the legitimacy of a state that had 
been perceived by many as intrusive and incompetent. The vision of a functioning 
democracy put forward by Karamanlis in the 1970s was a response to the populist 
rupture-in-the-making of the 1960s and it justified – as well as was underpinned by – 
Greece’s turn towards Europe.  
This long-term historical perspective offers important insights as to the reasons of the 
Greek state’s failure today. The long but inconclusive rupture between people and state 
during the Eurozone crisis can be attributed not only to the intensity of the economic 
downturn, but also to the excessive reliance since the 1990s on particularistic discourses 
and the neglect, to the point of extinction, of universal visions of the political community 
– a significant departure from past practices of official legitimation. 
This article ultimately functions as middle ground between damning (Pappas, 2013) 
and optimistic views (Stavrakakis, 2014) of populism’s role in Greece today. To those 
who celebrated the rise of SYRIZA as incarnation of Laclau’s vision of emancipatory 
politics it cautions that, once populism mutates from popular uprising to party politics, its 
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emancipatory function can easily transform into domestication of social demands and 
ultimately absorption in the logic of official legitimation. And to those who see the 
fickleness and irrationality of ‘the people’ behind all Greek malaise it counters that 
particularistic justifications of modernization are never a perfect substitute for universal 
and inclusive representations of the political community. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 For an application of Laclau’s discursive framework to cases of populism see Panizza 
(2005). For a comparative application of discourse theory and the insights of the so-called 
Essex School to political analysis more generally see Howarth et al (2000). 
2 See however the discussion in Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014: 139, ref. 25).  
3 Mavrogordatos notes that the Venizelists represented the universality of the unredeemed 
nation and the anti-Venizelists the territoriality of the state. But Mavrogordatos explains 
that the state the anti-Venizelists represented was not the actual (expanded) Greek state 
after 1913, but the idealized Old Greece within its pre-expansion borders. While they 
referred to the ‘state’, the anti-Venizelists in reality opposed the actual state that 
expanded under the leadership of Venizelos. The anti-Venizelist ‘state’ does not refer so 
much to modernizing and rationalizing political power as to an idealized heartland 
(Taggart, 2000) that opposition to modernization could rally around.   
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4 No relation to Eleftherios Venizelos.  
5 Evangelos Venizelos’ statement to the National Assembly of PASOK, 10 March 2012. 
A summary (in Greek) is available at http://news247.gr/eidiseis/politiki/venizelos-zhtw-
sygnwmh-apo-ton-ellhniko-lao-gia-ta-lathh-mas.1686012.html, accessed 27 June 2016. 
6  See the interactive map at http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/ng-
interactive/2015/jul/09/greek-referendum-how-athens-voted-interactive-map, accessed 28 
June 2016. 
7 Statement of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to his cabinet, 2 December 1993. 
Available at http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5272246/eite-to-ethnos-tha-
eksafanisei-to-xreos-eite-to-xreos-tha-afanisei-to-ethnos/, accessed 31 October 2016. 
